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Abstract
The literature on environmental policy under adverse selection usually as-
sumes that firms’ profit vary monotonically with a private information parame-
ter. However, it is easy to demonstrate using standard production setups that
regularity is not the rule. We show that policy requirements are very sensi-
tive to this assumption. In particular, the optimal instrument resembles more an
“adaptable” pollution standard than the economic instrument of an environmen-
tal tax. We also show that permitting, which results in some firms over-investing
in pollution-control equipment, does not serve the objective of improving the
environment but rather allows the agency to increase the proceeds of the policy.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long advocated the use of economic instruments such as taxation or
marketable permits rather than the typical command-and-control policies to reduce
pollution. However, the design of incentive schemes aimed at changing polluters’ be-
havior when the affected parties are privately informed about the costs and benefits
they incur is often complex. Several studies have suggested regulatory strategies for
dealing with pollution control when the necessary information is decentralized in the
economy (see Lewis 1996 for a survey). A main finding is that a conventional emission
fee is not sufficient for dealing with privately informed polluting firms. Firms are usu-
ally better informed than the regulator about their capabilities to reduce pollution. By
overstating the burden associated with their abatement effort they are able to extract
information rents. Such rents are generally costly for society, one reason being that
raising public funds through taxation involves a deadweight efficiency loss. The regula-
tor has thus to induce firms to reduce pollution at sufficiently high levels while limiting
their information rents. This implies that the amount of pollution reduction may be
distorted compared to its efficient level and that the taxation scheme is non-linear in
general so polluters do not equate their marginal costs of abatement.
These features of the optimal pollution tax under private information are usually
derived under the assumption that firms’ profits vary monotonically with a unidimen-
sional private information parameter (Baron 1985, Laffont 1994, Lewis 1996). However,
we show using a standard production setup that in some realistic situations regularity
of firms’ profits is not the rule and that the stringency of the environmental regulation
influences the extent of the asymmetric information problem. Indeed, consider a sector
composed of firms with the same production technology involving a polluting input
which substitutes for another, firm-specific one (like human capital, land fertility, or
process knowledge). If firms in the sector are not constrained, they use the polluting
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input only and they all extract the same profit from polluting. On the other extreme,
if polluting emissions are completely forbidden, as firms are diversely affected depend-
ing on the cost of the firm-specific inputs they use to replace the polluting input, the
sector presents the largest heterogeneity. Defining the firms’ private information pa-
rameter as the price differential between the polluting input and the firm-specific one,
the firms’ profit decreases with the private information parameter, meaning that, when
not allowed to pollute, firms with low (potential) marginal profits from polluting gen-
erate more profits than firms with larger (potential) marginal profits. An increase in
the emission cap allows firms to substitute part of the costly input with the cheaper
polluting one. The firms with the largest price differential are those that benefit the
most from the relaxation of the policy. Hence, the firms’ marginal profit from pollution
increases with the private information parameter. As a result, the profit that a firm
generates may increase or decrease with the private information parameter, depending
on the regulation.
Significant examples of comparable production settings can be found in the agricul-
tural sector, where pesticides and fertilizers are substitutes for labor and land quality.
Asymmetric information naturally appears with pesticides when farms are self-managed
since the opportunity cost of labor is often specific to farmers. Use of pesticides allows
farmers to spend less time on the farm, but even if time savings are approximately the
same for all farmers, their earnings off the farm may widely differ.1 Similarly, hetero-
geneity of individual situations also appears with fertilizer. Fertilizer allows farmers
to compensate for the productivity of their plots (the quality of the land), which is
not observable by the agency. Reducing the amount of fertilizer spread on the farms’
plots has diverse impacts on production depending on the quality of the soil, obliging
farmers to reorganize land use and their choices of crops.
1There is a vast literature on the economic factors of adoption by farmers of natural-resource-
conserving practices. In particular, Fuglie and Kascak (2001) show that the opportunity cost of time
is one of the factors that determine the adoption of less pesticides-intensive agricultural practices.
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By reconsidering the optimal design of emissions regulation in such situations, we
show that policy requirements are very sensitive to the assumption of regularity. Actu-
ally, compared to perfect information levels, firms extracting low pollution profits are
tempted to increase their discharge (overstatement of their type), while firms extract-
ing larger profits may prefer to reduce their emissions (understatement). Hence, the
non-regularity of their profits introduces the possibility that a large subset of firms are
pooled.
As a consequence, the optimal instrument resembles an “adaptable” pollution stan-
dard more than it does the economic instrument of an environmental tax. It is not
quite the usual textbook command-and-control policy, but hopefully its real-life im-
plementation. To implement the optimal allocation schedule, the policy must include
exemption regimes which allow for some flexibility. For example, firms with private
information parameter belonging to the lower tail of the distribution, which pollute
less than is allowed by the emission limit, should be exempted from part of the license
fee. In contrast, firms in the upper tail of the distribution, which exceed the standard,
should pay supplementary charges for emission level excess.
One way for the environmental agency to reduce the heterogeneity of a sector is to
induce or require firms to adopt sounder production technologies, or at least more effec-
tive abatement technologies. Indeed, by relaxing the constraint on the polluting input,
an abatement technology diminishes the need for firms to substitute for a firm-specific
factor and thus ultimately reduces the heterogeneity among the firms in the sector.
One method sometimes employed consists in offering subsidies dedicated to (partly)
covering the private costs of improvement in abatement technologies. Alternatively, a
more coercive and widespread approach consists in assigning firms a right or a “per-
mit” to operate only if some minimum requirements with respect to pollution control
technology are met. We examine how such a permitting policy interacts with the de-
sign of the emission regulation described just above. We show that permitting, which
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results in some firms over-investing in pollution-control equipment, does not serve the
objective of improving the environment but rather allows the agency to increase the
money raised by the policy.
The mechanism design approach of environmental policy that we adopt in this pa-
per is closely related to the analysis of countervailing incentives of incentive theory
(Lewis and Sappington 1989a and 1989b, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1995 and Jullien
2000). Some of these works, developed in the context of production regulation, suggest
that countervailing incentives are favored by the principal to diminish information rents
left to the agent. For instance, Lewis and Sappington (1989b) show that the principal
benefits from a somewhat artificial introduction of countervailing incentives by giving
the agent an input necessary for production. We show that countervailing incentives
may emerge naturally in the environmental regulation context, with the similar conse-
quence that optimal contracts consist of a standard (a rule), with allowances given to
exceptional cases only.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and
discusses the effects of an environmental regulation on the heterogeneity of a sector.
Section 3 analyzes the benchmark case of the optimal regulation under perfect informa-
tion. Section 4 presents the regulatory mechanism when information rents are costly
due to the social cost of public funds. We first consider the optimal design of emission
regulations without permitting and then analyze the effects of permitting policies. The
last section concludes.
2 Heterogeneity induced by environmental regula-
tions
It is usually assumed in the literature on environmental policy under asymmetric infor-
mation that firms differ in a (one-dimensional) private information parameter and that
their profits vary monotonically with it (Lewis 1996). The optimal regulation allows
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the regulator to screen firms, and generally consists in a non-linear allocation-payment
schedule, provided that the firm’s marginal profit also varies monotonically with the
private information parameter, the so-called Spence-Mirrlees “single-crossing” condi-
tion. Whereas this latter property is a plausible assumption which may be considered
as the mere characteristic of the private information parameter, it does not imply, and
thus hardly justifies, the other common assumption of monotonic profits. In fact, it is
easy to show using standard production setups that it is not generally the case, and
particularly when we consider the pollution induced by inputs that may substitute
for other components of production which are firm-specific, like investment in process
knowledge, human capital, or labor.
To illustrate, consider a sector composed of firms that may use 2 inputs in quantities
zi, i = 0, 1, where input 0 stands for a polluting input and input 1 for a “clean” one. For
instance, input 0 represents pesticides while input 1 stands for labor on a self-managed
farm. The use of one unit of input 0 generates one unit of emission.2 Denote by wi the
price of input i and assume that w0 is a market price (known to the agency) while w1 is
the firm-specific cost of input 1, with w1 > w0. Private information parameter θ can be
defined as the firm-specific price differential between inputs 0 and 1, i.e., θ = w1 −w0.
Assume that every firm is endowed with the same amount z¯ of input 1, but can buy
or sell any amount of this input at specific price w1 = θ + w0.
When an environmental regulation constrains firms to emission level y, their re-
stricted cost function is given by
c(Q; y, θ) = min
z0,z1
{w0z0 + (θ + w0)z1 : Q = f(z0, z1); z0 ≤ y} (1)
where Q is the output level and f(·) the production function. Denote by zd1(Q; y, θ)
the corresponding demand of input 1. The restricted profit function associated to (1)
2Generalizations to more than 2 inputs and other pollution functions are straightforward.
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is defined as
B(θ, y) = (θ + w0)z¯ +max
Q
{pQ− c(Q; y, θ)} (2)
where the first term corresponds to the value of the firm’s endowment in input 1, and
the second term the firm’s profit from polluting. Hotelling’s lemma implies that3
Bθ(θ, y) = z¯ − zd1(Q∗(θ, y); y, θ)
where Q∗(θ, y) corresponds to the firms’ optimal production choice. Bθ(θ, y) is thus the
opposite of the firms’ net demand in input 1 and can be positive or negative depending
on z¯ and θ. Indeed, if zd1(·) > z¯ the firm buys input 1 while it is a net supplier of input 1
otherwise.4 More specifically, consider that the two inputs are perfectly substitutable,
with a production function given by
f(z0, z1) = (z0 + z1)
α, (3)
where α < 1. We have
zd1(Q; y, θ) = max{0, Q1/α − y},
meaning that absent any environmental regulation, or a very lax one, firms would use
input 0 only and sell their total endowment z¯. Simple computations also give
Q∗(θ, y) =
{
(αp/w0)
α/(1−α) y ≥ (αp/w0)1/(1−α)
[αp/(θ + w0)]
α/(1−α) y < (αp/w0)1/(1−α)
and
B(θ, y) = (θ + w0)z¯ +
{
(αp/wα0 )
1/(1−α)(1− α)/α y ≥ (αp/w0)1/(1−α)
[αp/(θ + w0)
α]1/(1−α) (1− α)/α+ θy y < (αp/w0)1/(1−α)
3We denote by hx the partial derivative of function h(·) with respect to variable x.
4This non-monotonicity property of profit functions is directly obtained from the general setup of
production sets for multiproduct firms. Hotelling’s lemma states that the derivative of profit functions
with respect to the price vector corresponds to the firm’s “netput” vector. In our context, one of the
goods has a price which is firm-specific, indexed by θ. Depending on the specific price one firm faces,
its “netput” may correspond to a net demand or a net supply of the good, and hence Bθ(θ, y) can
be either positive or negative depending on θ. The policy instrument y modifies the firms’ private
tradeoffs, and thus changes the firms’ optimal netput vectors. We have chosen this simpler framework
(which illustrates straightforwardly the way the environmental regulation interacts with the firms’
choices and changes the firms’ profit pattern) for analytical convenience.
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It can be easily verified thatBy(θ, y) ≥ 0, whileBθ(θ, y) = z¯ > 0 when y ≥ (αp/w0)1/(1−α)
andBθ(θ, y) = z¯+y−[αp/(θ + w0)]α/(1−α) otherwise, the latter being an increasing func-
tion of θ.5 Hence, when the environmental policy is stringent (i.e., y < (αp/w0)
1/(1−α)),
Bθ(θ, y) can be negative for low θs and positive for larger ones, while we have By(θ, y) =
θ > 0. This is easily understood: without regulation, or a very lax one (y is large), firms
use the polluting input only and generate the same profit from polluting whatever the
price of the firm-specific input. At the other extreme, when a regulation is in place
and no allowances are given to firms (y = 0), the firms with the lowest specific cost
of the “replacement input” are the less affected. More generally, when z¯ is low, firms’
profits are decreasing with θ, meaning that the lower the firm-specific cost of input 1,
the less the impact of the prohibition. An increase in the emission quota allows firms
to substitute part of the costly input 1 with the same amount of the cheaper input
0. Firms with the larger cost of the input 1 are those that benefit the most from the
relaxation of the policy. We can thus draw the following consequences from production
function (3):
Claim 1 Absent an environmental regulation, the firms’ profit from polluting is the
same whatever θ.
Claim 2 Under a stringent emission cap, firms are heterogeneous both in their to-
tal and marginal profits from polluting. The firm’s marginal profit from polluting
increases with the private information parameter (we have By(θ, y) = θ when y <
(αp/w0)
1/(1−α)), while the firms’ total profit may be decreasing or increasing with it,
depending on the stringency of the environmental regulation.
As we show in the following section, the regulator may take advantage of profit
5We have By(θ, y) = θ for y < (αp/w0)1/(1−α) and 0 otherwise. More generally, when inputs 0 and
1 are not perfectly substitutable, we have By(θ, y) = (θ+w0)fz0(y, z
d)/fz1(y, z
d)−w0. Consequently,
the firms’ marginal benefit from polluting depends on the marginal rate of substitution, −∆z1/∆z0,
which decreases with y. Hence, the more stringent the environmental policy (the lower y), the higher
By.
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functions which are non-monotonic with the firms’ private information parameter to
diminish the social costs of information rents.6 However, Claim 2 needs a caveat. In-
deed, to attenuate the stringency of the environmental regulation, firms may choose to
reduce their net emissions into the environment, denoted by q, by abating their gross
pollution level according to q = y − a, where a is the abatement effort. By relaxing
the constraint on the polluting input, this would ultimately reduce the heterogeneity
among the firms in the sector. However, abating pollution is costly, with an abatement
cost that depends on the firms’ investment in pollution-control technologies. To reduce
the heterogeneity of the firms in the sector, the agency may thus decide to impose a
technological standard corresponding to required pollution-control equipment I0. This
is the case when firms have to receive allowances from the agency to operate before
starting production in a specific area. This permitting policy consists of requiring firms
to adopt at least several minimum pollution-control apparatus (e.g., a minimum size
of a water purification facility or of waste containment equipment, a minimum scrub-
ber’s capacity, etc.). We shall take into account this possibility in the following, and
to strengthen our results we assume that only the profit from polluting is firm-specific
while the abatement technology is not (e.g., end-of-pipe abatement technology).7 For
a given abatement effort and investment level, the firm’s abatement cost is thus per-
fectly known to the agency. More precisely, for an investment I in pollution-control
technologies and an abatement effort a, the profit of a θ-type firm is given by
p˜i(y, a, I, θ) = B(θ, y)− A(a, I)− I, (4)
where A(a, I) is convex, satisfying A(0, I) = 0 and AIa < 0 (investment in pollution-
6Countervailing incentives were first analyzed by Lewis and Sappington (1989a) in the context of
regulation of natural monopolies. Also see Lewis and Sappington (1989b), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
(1995), and Jullien (2000).
7Were the abatement cost firm-specific, it would be obvious that regulating the firms’ technology
choices would allow the agency to diminish the detrimental consequences of the firms’ informational
advantage.
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control technology allows firms to reduce the marginal cost of abatement).8 To pursue
the analysis, we shall consider a simple form of (2) given by
B(θ, y) = K/θ + θy, (5)
Firms’ profits are thus composed of a fixed (K/θ) and a variable (θy) component. K/θ
corresponds to the minimal profit that firms can obtain without polluting, and θy the
additional amount procured by emitting gross pollution level y.
3 The optimal environmental regulation
Since pollution abatement is costly, without environmental regulation firms neither in-
vest in a pollution-control technology nor abate emissions. They extract as much profit
as possible by polluting. To induce producers to internalize environmental damage, the
regulator’s task is to design an emission-payment schedule, and eventually to comple-
ment it with permitting. An emission-payment schedule consists of individualized pairs
of a monetary transfer and an emission level, one for each firm’s possible value of the
private information parameter θ. Emission-payment schedules can be straightforwardly
interpreted as an environmental tax scheme, but the mechanism design approach we
follow allows us to encompass any policy resulting in an emission-payment schedule.
Indeed, we shall see that the real-life implementation of the optimal schedule resembles
an environmental emission standard policy. The difficulty of the agency’s task comes
from the fact that it only knows that θ is distributed among firms over a non-negative
interval Θ = [θ, θ¯] according to a cumulative distribution function G(θ) and continuous
density g(θ).9
While it is possible that the environmental regulation also individualizes the level of
investment in an abatement technology, we consider in the following only “permitting”
8Convexity implies Aaa > 0, AII > 0 and AaaAII − A2Ia ≥ 0. We also assume that AI(a∗, 0) < 1
and Aa(0, I) = 0 to allow for interior solutions.
9We also make the usual monotonicity assumptions d[(1−G)/g]/dθ < 0 and d[G/g]/dθ > 0.
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regulations, which are commonly observed in large sectors. Under such regulations,
accreditations are given by specialized inspectors to firms complying with abatement
equipment rules before production begins. Once they are allowed to produce, firms pe-
riodically (annually) declare their emission level to the administration and are charged
(or given) the corresponding payment, whatever the size of their abatement technology.
The administration may decide to verify the firm’s declaration, but these inspections
are not systematic and do not usually require highly specialized inspectors.
We assume that, because of the so-called “second dividend,” the agency is not
indifferent to the funds raised using an environmental policy. Indeed, using taxation
to correct externalities also allows the government to diminish the tax burden that
weighs on the rest of society. This reduction decreases the deadweight losses associated
with other existing tax systems, such as income taxation, that cause distortions in
the economy. Levying t on a polluting firm with an environmental tax allows the
government to diminish other taxes by the same amount. This induces an indirect
social gain of (1 + λ)t − t = λt, where λ is a per monetary unit measure of these
deadweight losses (1 + λ is commonly called the shadow cost of public funds).10
Before analyzing the optimal regulation under asymmetric information, it is use-
ful to characterize the benchmark case of a perfect information policy designed by a
well-informed and plenipotent regulator who may require of firms any investment in
pollution control equipment and any abatement levels, as well as payment and emission
levels.
3.1 The perfect information benchmark
The regulator’s task is thus to design an emission-payment schedule {q(·), t(·)}, where
t(θ) is the amount paid by θ-type firms for q(θ) emission allowances, and to impose an
investment-abatement schedule I(·), a(·) to maximize the expected social welfare given
10For a discussion of the second dividend effect, see Bovenberg and Goulder (1996).
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by
W =
∫ θ¯
θ
[p˜i(y(θ), a(θ), I(θ), θ)−D(q(θ)) + λt(θ)]g(θ)dθ, (6)
where D(q) is the environmental damage, an increasing and convex function of individ-
ual emissions. To illustrate, we shall assume that this damage is given by D(q) = q2/2.
The optimal policy is characterized in the following proposition whose proof is left to
the reader.
Proposition 3 The perfect information policy {tPI(θ), qPI(θ), IPI(θ), aPI(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}
corresponds to payment and emission pattern tPI(·)and qPI(·) satisfying
tPI(θ) = pi(qPI(θ), θ) (7)
qPI(θ) = (1 + λ)θ (8)
while investment and abatement schemes IPI(·) and aPI(·) correspond to first-best levels
I∗(·) and a∗(·) implicitly defined by
−AI(a∗(θ), I∗(θ)) = 1, (9)
and
θ − Aa(a∗(θ), I∗(θ)) = 0. (10)
Since the public objective increases with firms’ payments, the regulator captures
their entire profits as stated in (7). This is the obvious consequence of the second-
dividend effect. Indeed, when λ = 0, there is no reason to charge firms per se since
profits left to firms are not socially costly.11 Another consequence of the second-
dividend effect is an emission schedule (8) larger than the first-best levels. Indeed,
first-best levels are defined by the Pigovian rule of equating marginal private profits
to marginal social damage, which would be the case with (8) were λ = 0. On the
contrary, with distortions in the rest of the economy (λ > 0), the regulator allows firms
11Hence, when λ = 0, the omnipotent regulator may decide to subsidize firms.
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to over-pollute when compared to first-best levels. Indeed, since the agency captures
all pollution profits, increased emission levels means that more money is collected.
This tax-profit objective does not affect the optimal investment and abatement levels
which correspond to first-best. This comes from the fact that the marginal benefit
from polluting of the θ-type firm is the same whatever y chosen by the firm. First-best
levels satisfy (10) and (9), which state that the abatement level must allow the firm to
equate the marginal abatement cost with the marginal benefit of polluting, and that
the optimal investment level equalizes the marginal benefit of an increased abatement
capacity to the marginal financial cost of the investment. This is exactly the private
trade-off faced by a firm. Indeed, without permitting, a θ-type firm freely chooses its
optimal abatement effort a∗(θ) and technology investment I∗(θ) to reach
pi(q, θ) ≡ max
a,I
p˜i(q + a, a, I, θ), (11)
which is the profit level, gross of emission payments, that it reaches under the public
policy for given q and t whatever λ. Hence, it is important to stress that
Corollary 4 It is not necessary to intervene in the firms’ investment and abatement
choices under perfect information.
Given convexity of A(·), optimal investment level and abatement effort are increas-
ing functions of the firm’s type. Indeed, by differentiating (10) and (9), we come to
I∗′(θ) =
−AIa
AaaAII − A2Ia
> 0 (12)
and
a∗′(θ) =
AII
AaaAII − A2Ia
> 0 (13)
which mean that the higher the firm’s profitability of polluting emission, the larger its
pollution-control equipment and cleaning effort. Observe also that we have
dtPI
dqPI
= 2θ − [K/θ2 − a∗(θ)]/(1 + λ).
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Hence, for K sufficiently high, the perfect information payment-emission schedule is
decreasing then increasing, which means that compared to other firms, firms in the
lower tail of the distribution are submitted to larger payments for fewer allowances.
This comes from the fact that the regulator wants to capture the firms’ profits which are
decreasing with θ in the lower tail of the distribution. Such a tax-scheme is obviously
not implementable under asymmetric information, since these firms would choose to
pollute more in order to decrease their tax-payment.
4 Adverse selection and environmental policy
Under asymmetric information, the agency encounters two types of adverse selection
problems when designing an environmental policy for firms with non-monotonic profits.
As firms’ profits are declining in the lower tail of the distribution, it is impossible for
the agency to capture the entire profits of firms with low marginal pollution benefits
because they may diminish their payment by pretending to have higher marginal pol-
lution benefits. On the upper tail of the firms’ distribution, profits are increasing but
the difficulty is the same: it is impossible to capture the entire profit of firms with high
marginal pollution benefits because they may pretend to have lower marginal pollution
benefits. By mimicking a lower-type firm, they would have fewer emission allowances,
but since the profit they extract by polluting is higher than for these lower-type firms,
they end up having positive profits.
We analyze how the agency deals with these adverse selection problems by first
investigating the situation where firms are not required to get an operating permit.
The agency regulates the emission level using only an emission-payment scheme. We
then introduce the permitting policy as part of the regulatory arsenal and analyze
the interaction with the emission control policy. This two-step procedure will allow
us to separate the effects of the permitting policy from the rest of the environmental
regulation.
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4.1 Environmental policy without permitting
The regulation process under asymmetric information is modeled as a two-stage game.
First, the regulator chooses an emission-payment schedule. Second, firms choose their
abatement technology and effort and report their type (i.e., they choose a net emission
and payment pair). More formally, the environmental agency’s mechanism consists of
q(θ˜), t(θ˜), where θ˜ is the reported type. From the revelation principle, we can restrict
the search for the optimal mechanism to the set of direct and incentive-compatible
mechanisms. The expected profit of a θ-type firm that announces θ˜ is given by
U(θ, θ˜) = pi(q(θ˜), θ)− t(θ˜) (14)
and the incentive-compatibility constraints can by written as
U(θ, θ) ≥ U(θ, θ˜)
for all θ and θ˜, which states that firms are better off announcing their true parameter
than lying about it. This prevents θ-type firms from finding it worthwhile to mimic
other types of firms by choosing an emission-payment pair which is not intended for
them. Let us denote by R(θ) the profit of a θ-type firm that truthfully announces its
type, i.e.,
R(θ) = U(θ, θ). (15)
Using (14), the incentive-compatibility constraints can be equivalently written as
R(θ) ≥ R(θ˜) + pi(q(θ˜), θ)− pi(q(θ˜), θ˜) (IC)
for all θ and θ˜, meaning that the difference of net profits between the θ and θ˜ -type
firms must be at least equal to the difference between their gross profits. The agency
must also take into account the firm’s participation constraint, which is given by
R(θ) ≥ 0 (IR)
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for all θ ∈ Θ. The agency’s program may thus be written as
max
q,R
{∫ θ¯
θ
[(1 + λ)pi(q(θ), θ)−D(q(θ))− λR(θ)]g(θ)dθ : (IC), (IR)
}
I
Compared to the perfect information policy where (IR) is binding for all firms, a
strictly positive profit corresponds to an “information rent” for the firms that enjoy
it. The term E[λR] thus corresponds to the information cost of the policy, due to
constraints (IC).
Problem I presents two sets of inequality constraints and cannot be solved directly.
However, incentive constraints can be simplified thanks to the following lemma, whose
proof is standard and thus omitted:
Lemma 5 Incentive constraints (IC) reduce to
R˙(θ) = −K/θ2 + a∗(θ) + q(θ) (IC1)
and
q(θ) ≥ q(θ˜) for all (θ, θ˜) ∈ Θ2 : θ > θ˜ (MN)
Proof: standard.
By (IC1), to deter imitation, information rents must evolve according to the marginal
profitability advantage at the assigned emission level. As mentioned above, this marginal
profitability advantage is composed of two opposite terms: As θ increases, the profit
without polluting (equal to K/θ) decreases, while the profit extracted from gross pol-
lution level (given by θ[a∗(θ) + q(θ)]) increases. Given that marginal pollution profits
increase with the type of firm, the “single crossing” condition holds in this context.
However, since R˙(θ) given by (IC1) may be either positive or negative, marginal in-
formation rents are not always monotonic. In particular, since a∗ and q are increasing
and K/θ2 is decreasing, R may be first decreasing and then increasing. Hence, we
would have at least one firm’s type for which the (marginal) incentives to understate
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and to overstate their type exactly compensate. For firms with lower or larger types,
information rents would be higher. This is particularly interesting for the agency since
in order to increase the proceeds of the policy, the agency must reduce information
rents as much as possible, i.e., R(θ) = 0 for a large set of firms. The marginal increase
of information rents is null for these firms, i.e., we have R˙(θ) = 0 for a subset of type,
which implies gross pollution levels y(θ) = K/θ2 for these firms. But the corresponding
emission schedule q(θ) = K/θ2− a∗(θ) would be decreasing. Consequently, constraints
(MN) are not satisfied, i.e., the policy is not incentive-compatible. Incentive-compatible
policies thus entail binding emission constraints (MN), and the corresponding emission
schedule presents a “flat” segment, i.e., q(θ) = q¯ whenever (MN) binds.12 The resulting
schedule is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The optimal emission schedule solution of program I is given by
qˆ(θ) =

q1(θ) for all θ < θ0
q¯ for all θ0 ≤ θ ≤ θ1
q2(θ) for all θ > θ1
(16)
where
q1(θ) ≡ qPI(θ) + λG(θ)/g(θ)
q2(θ) ≡ qPI(θ)− λ[1−G(θ)]/g(θ)
and q¯ satisfies ∫ θ∗
θ0
[q¯ − q1(θ)]g(θ)dθ =
∫ θ1
θ∗
[q2(θ)− q¯]g(θ)dθ (17)
with
q¯ = q1(θ0) = q2(θ1) = K/θ
∗2 − a∗(θ∗). (18)
Proof: See appendix.
The emission schedule (16) entails three different regimes, as depicted in Fig. 5.
For the first regime, θ < θ0, the emission schedule is strictly higher than q
PI(θ), except
12This problem has been investigated in detail by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).
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for θ, the lowest type of firms. In this interval, information rents decrease. Low θ firms
may pretend to extract pollution profits, thus to have a low profit without polluting,
so as to reduce their payment. However, the larger the allowance for higher-type firms,
the less beneficial the mimicking. Indeed, by increasing the allowances for higher-type
firms, the agency also increases the corresponding payments. With a dq increase in
emissions over the perfect information level qPI(θ) for the θ-type firms, the agency
can increase their payment by θdq. But this increase diminishes by dq the marginal
benefits that lower-type firms extract from mimicking θ-type firms. Hence, the agency
can raise by dq the tax collected on the G(θ) firms with type lower than θ, which yields
a social benefit λG(θ)dq that the agency has to balance with the social welfare loss
of the dq increase in emissions for the g(θ) θ-type firms. This loss is negligible since
we have (1 + λ)θ − D′(qPI(θ)) = 0. Trade-offs for larger emission increases result in
optimal schedule q1(·).
For the third regime, θ > θ1, we have the opposite result, as the optimal emission
schedule is strictly lower than with perfect information, except for θ, the highest type.
In this interval, information rents increase. As firms wish to reduce their payment,
they are tempted to pretend that they extract fewer pollution profits. However, the
lower the allowances for low-type firms, the less beneficial the mimicking. Indeed, a
marginal decrease dq from qPI(θ) has a negligible effect on the welfare generated by
the g(θ) θ-type firms, but allows for social gains λ(1−G(θ))dq > 0 on all firms of type
higher than θ due to decreased information rents. It is thus optimal to reduce emission
assignments on this interval, with the optimal schedule given by q2(·).
Finally, the second regime of the emission schedule presents a “flat” (pooling) seg-
ment for intermediary types (θ0 ≤ θ ≤ θ1). These firms are therefore induced to
pollute according to constant level q¯. To explain the pooling interval, recall that the
agency would like to extract the profits from firms of intermediate types. But setting
q(θ) = K/θ2 − a∗(θ) over a subset results in a decreasing emission schedule, and leads
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to the violation of incentive constraints. The agency can do no better than to induce
the same level of net pollution q¯, in [θ0, θ1]. The extent of this pooling interval is given
by the intersection between q¯ and the first and third regime of scheme qˆ. It is opti-
mally determined by (17), which states that in [θ0, θ1], decreased marginal damage for
low-types firms, due to a q¯ emission level lower than q1(θ) for θ < θ
∗, must compensate
for increased marginal damage for high-type (θ > θ∗), due to q¯ being greater than
q2(θ). θ
∗ corresponds to firms for which the countervailing incentives to overstate and
understate their type have the same magnitude and annihilate each other. These firms
cannot extract information rent and thus their tax payment corresponds to their entire
profit, as in the perfect information case. All other firms enjoy positive rents.
Any emission-payment schedule can be interpreted as a non-linear taxation scheme,
and therefore environmental taxation generally proves to be the best policy instrument.
However, when a large subset of firms are pooled, the optimal schedule resembles more
an emission standard-cum-license fee.13
More precisely, schedule (16) can be implemented through an “adaptable” emission
standard policy whose interpretation is the following. To be allowed to pollute up to
the q¯ emission quota, firms have to pay a license fee equal to pi(q¯, θ∗). This is the choice
for firms of intermediate-type, which belong to the set [θ0, θ1]. The policy also includes
two sorts of exemption regimes. Firms in the lower tail of the distribution, i.e., of
type lower than θ0, must be compensated for emission levels lower than the standard
and thus are exempted from part of the license fee according to their emission deficits.
Firms in the upper tail of the distribution, i.e., of type larger than θ1, must be allowed
to exceed the standard by paying supplementary charges according to their excess in
emission level.
13Using a uniform distribution, it is straightforward that the proportion of firms that pollute at
the quota is given by λ/(1 + 2λ). This proportion increases with λ but cannot exceed 50%, which is
relatively low. However, we can expect a larger proportion of firms under the emission quota with
distributions more concentrated around their mean values.
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4.2 Permitting and the environmental policy
We now derive the effect of a permitting policy on the optimal regulation. This policy
consists in requiring firms to adopt a minimum size of pollution-control equipment I0 in
order to obtain their operating permit. Since private equipment choices I∗(θ) increase
with the firm’s type, i.e., dI∗/dθ ≥ 0, only low-profitability firms are constrained by
the technological standard I0. Indeed, firms with a profitability parameter below the
threshold type θs ≡ I∗−1(I0) would have chosen a technology level lower than I0 (i.e.,
I∗(θ) < I0). For all the firms that would have purchased less than the required level
I0, we have
−AI(aˆ(θ), I0)− 1 < 0,
i.e., for all θ ≤ θs, the marginal net private value of pollution-control technology is
negative at the emission level aˆ(θ) chosen by the firm, which satisfies the following
first-order condition:
Aa(aˆ(θ), I0) = θ. (19)
What can motivate the agency to impose excessive pollution-control equipment on
firms that pollute the least? The answer resides in the impact of this overcapacity on
the rents extraction potential of the environmental policy. With over-investment in
abatement technology, firms are induced to increase their gross pollution level, which
is less beneficial the lower the firm’s marginal benefit from polluting. As a result,
firms’ profits in the lower tail of the distribution (the types lower than θs) are less
heterogeneous. Indeed, the supplementary charge in investment is larger the lower the
type, while the increase in pollution profits is larger the larger the type. This “flattens”
the profit profile of firms in the lower tail of the distribution, which reduces the benefits
that low-type firms extract from mimicking higher types.
This can be seem from (IC1) and (19), which indicate that information rents evolve
positively with the firms’ abatement levels and that abatement levels increase with the
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capacity of the pollution-control equipment. Indeed, for low θ, standard I0 modifies
(IC1), which reads as
R˙(θ) = −K/θ2 + aˆ(θ) + q(θ). (20)
Differentiating (19), we obtain that for these firms, an increase in the technological
standard affects marginal information rents by dR˙/dI0 = daˆ/dI0 = −AIa/Aaa > 0.
Since information rents of low-type firms decrease (we have R˙ < 0 for θ < θ∗), a
standard allows the agency to attenuate this decrease and thus to reduce the rents in
the lower tail of the distribution of firms. Consequently, for given net emission levels
the agency is able to increase the corresponding payments by imposing a technological
standard.
We now investigate more closely the policy mix. The regulation process is mod-
eled as a three-stage game. First, the regulator chooses an emission-payment schedule
{t(·), q(·)} and a pollution-control technology standard I0. Second, firms choose their
abatement technology. Firms are inspected and those that do not comply with require-
ment I0 are not allowed to produce (i.e., the plant is closed down). Third, remaining
firms report their type (i.e., they choose their net emission and payment pairs) and
simultaneously decide on their abatement effort.
The objective of the regulator is to maximize the expected social welfare given by∫ θ¯
θ
[(1 + λ)p˜i(q(θ) + aˆ(θ), aˆ(θ), Iˆ(θ), θ)−D(q(θ))− λR(θ)]g(θ)dθ,
where Iˆ(θ) ≥ I0 is the investment choice induced on the θ-type firms, which verifies
AI(aˆ(θ), Iˆ(θ)) + 1 ≥ 0 (21)
with strict inequality whenever Iˆ(θ) = I0, and aˆ(θ) is the corresponding abatement
effort, given by
Aa(aˆ(θ), Iˆ(θ)) = θ. (22)
As in the previous section, R(θ) and q(θ) are subject to (MN) and (20) respectively.
The optimal policy is characterized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 7 Under the optimal policy,
(i) firms with a profitability parameter below threshold type θs ≡ I∗−1(I0) ≤ θ∗ are
constrained by the optimal technological standard I0, satisfying∫ θs
θ
{
AI(aˆ(θ), I0) + 1 +
λ
1 + λ
AIa(aˆ(θ), I0)
Aaa(aˆ(θ), I0)
G(θ)
g(θ)
}
g(θ)dθ = 0 (23)
where aˆ(·) is given by (19), and
(ii) the optimal emission schedule is still given by (16)-(18).
Proof: See appendix.
As indicated in point (i), θs ≤ θ∗, i.e., only firms in the lower tail of the distribution
are constrained by the emission standard. The motive for public intervention clearly
appears in (23) whose integrand is the opposite of the “virtual surplus” derived from
a marginal increase in the technological standard for the θ-type firm. This increase
diminishes θ-type firms’ profit, which corresponds to a social cost equal to (1+λ)(AI+1)
for these g(θ) firms, but allows the agency to reduce the information rents of the
G(θ) less productive firms by a marginal amount equal to AIa/Aaa, and thus save
λG(θ)AIa/Aaa on rents. This virtual surplus is negative for low-profitability firms
(marginal gains for low types are small) but positive for more profitable firms. The
optimal standard balances these marginal gains and losses.
Point (ii) of proposition 7 states that the optimal emission schedule is the same
as the one imposed without permitting. The requirement of oversize pollution-control
equipment is thus for tax-raising purposes only, and not to diminish the emissions of
these firms. In particular, as θs ≤ θ∗, the “licence fee” pi(q¯, θ∗) discussed above is
not affected by the technological standard since θ∗-type firms are not forced to over-
invest in abatement technology. Only the rebates for emission levels lower than the
standard are changed. Firms with type lower than θs suffer for two reasons from the
permitting policy: Rebates are decreased and the increases in gross pollution profits
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do not reimburse the cost of the over-investments (the difference between I∗(θ) and I0
for the θ-type firm).
5 Conclusion
We have studied the optimal regulation of pollution while reconsidering the regularity
assumption that firms’ profits vary monotonically with the private information pa-
rameter, an assumption usually found in the literature on environmental policy under
adverse selection. We have shown that policy requirements are very sensitive to this
assumption. In particular, the optimal instrument resembles more an “adaptable” pol-
lution standard than the economic instrument of an environmental tax. We have also
shown that permitting, which actually requires firms to over-invest in pollution-control
equipment, does not serve the objective of improving the environment but rather allows
the agency to increase the proceeds of the policy.
Note that, under complete information, a technological standard would be useless
because once net emissions are taxed at the Pigovian level, firms adopt the abatement
technologies corresponding to socially efficient equipment. This is no longer true under
incomplete information because the private and social values of a new abatement tech-
nology are no longer the same, due to informational rents. When adding a minimum
technological standard to the regulatory arsenal, the informational rents left to firms
are reduced.
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Figure 1: Optimal emission schedule
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Appendix
A Resolution of program I
Monotonicity constraint (MN) can be expressed as
q˙(θ) = δ(θ) (24)
with δ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. We denote by [θ0, θ1] the subset of Θ where δ(θ) = 0,
i.e. where (MN) is binding. Over this set, we have q(θ) = q¯. Denoting by ν and γ the
Lagrange multipliers corresponding to (IC1) and (24), the Lagrangian of this program
is given by
L =
∫ θ¯
θ
{[(1 + λ)pi(q, θ)−D(q)− λR]g + ν(−K/θ2 + a∗ + q − R˙) + γ(δ − q˙)}dθ (25)
where γ = 0 whenever δ > 0. Integration by parts gives∫ θ¯
θ
νR˙dθ = ν(θ¯)R(θ¯)− ν(θ)R(θ)−
∫ θ¯
θ
ν˙Rdθ
and ∫ θ¯
θ
γq˙dθ = γ(θ¯)q(θ¯)− γ(θ)q(θ)−
∫ θ¯
θ
γ˙qdθ
Lagrangian (25) becomes
L =
∫ θ¯
θ
Hdθ −R(θ¯)ν(θ¯) +R(θ)ν(θ)− γ(θ¯)q(θ¯) + γ(θ)q(θ)
where
H ≡ [(1 + λ)pi(q, θ)−D(q)]g +R[ν˙ − λg] + ν(−K/θ2 + a∗ + q) + γ˙q + γδ
Transversality conditions are deduced from
∂L
∂R(θ¯)
= −ν(θ¯) ≤ 0 (26)
and
∂L
∂R(θ)
= ν(θ) ≤ 0 (27)
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and since there is no condition on emission levels q(θ¯) and q(θ) (other than non-
negativity), we have γ(θ¯) = γ(θ) = 0.
Pointwise maximizations give
∂H
∂q
= [(1 + λ)θ − q]g + ν + γ˙ = 0 (28)
∂H
∂δ
= γ ≤ 0 (q˙ ≥ 0) (29)
∂H
∂R
= ν˙ − λg ≤ 0 (R ≥ 0) (30)
Integrating (30) over [θ, θ¯] gives
ν(θ¯)− ν(θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
ν˙du ≤ λ
∫ θ¯
θ
g(u)du = λ[1−G(θ)]
and thus, using (26),
ν(θ) ≥ −λ[1−G(θ)]
Integrating (30) over [θ, θ] also gives
ν(θ)− ν(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
ν˙(u)du ≤ λ
∫ θ
θ
g(u)du = λG(θ)
Consequently, using (27), we have
λG(θ) ≥ ν(θ) ≥ −λ[1−G(θ)]
for all θ ∈ Θ. To diminish the rents, having (IR) constraints binding on a Θ subset, i.e.,
R(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [α, β] ⊂ Θ, would be optimal absent the monotonicity constraint on
quantities. Indeed, we would have R˙(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (α, β), i.e., q(θ) = K/θ2−a∗(θ),
which is decreasing. We thus have to take account of (MN), implying that q(θ) = q¯
over some interval [θ0, θ1], with R˙(θ) < 0 for all θ < θ0 and R˙(θ) > 0 for all θ > θ1.
Denote by θ∗ ∈ (θ0, θ1) the threshold type verifying
q¯ = K/θ∗2 − a∗(θ∗)
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For all θ ∈ (θ0, θ∗), we have
R˙(θ) = −K/θ2 + a∗(θ) + q¯
= K(1/θ∗2 − 1/θ2) + a∗(θ)− a∗(θ∗)
< 0
hence R(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ∗), and thus ν(θ) = λG(θ) on this set. For all
θ ∈ (θ∗, θ1), the same computations give R˙(θ) > 0, hence R(θ) > 0 and thus ν(θ) =
−λ[1−G(θ)] on this set. Consequently, R(θ) = 0 for θ = θ∗ only, and co-state ν “falls
down” at θ∗ from λG(θ∗) to −λ[1−G(θ∗)]. Schedules q1 and q2 are deduced from (28),
with γ˙ = 0 using ν(θ) = λG(θ) and ν(θ) = −λ[1 − G(θ)] respectively. Since they are
both increasing under our assumptions on the distribution of θ, we have qˆ(θ) = q1(θ)
for all θ ≤ θ0 and qˆ(θ) = q2(θ) for all θ ≥ θ1. For θ ∈ (θ0, θ∗), (28) gives
γ˙(θ) = −[q¯ − q1(θ)]g(θ)
and, for θ ∈ (θ∗, θ1),
γ˙(θ) = [q2(θ)− q¯]g(θ).
Integrating over (θ0, θ
∗) and (θ∗, θ1) respectively yields
γ(θ1)− γ(θ0) = −
∫ θ∗
θ0
[q¯ − q1(θ)]g(θ)dθ +
∫ θ1
θ∗
[q2(θ)− q¯]g(θ)dθ
As γ(θ) = 0 for all θ /∈ [θ0, θ1], continuity imposes γ(θ0) = γ(θ1) = 0, which gives
(17).
B Proof of proposition 7
The condition I(θ) = I0 for all θ < θs can also be written as I(θ) = I0 and I˙(θ) = 0 for
all θ ∈ (θ, θs). Denoting by ω(·) the corresponding Lagrange multiplier and integrating
to obtain ∫ θ¯
θ
ω(θ)I˙(θ)dθ = ω(θ¯)I(θ¯)− ω(θ)I0 −
∫ θ¯
θ
ω˙(θ)I(θ)dθ
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where ω(θ) = ω˙(θ) = 0 for all θ > θs, the Lagrangian of the agency’s program is given
by
LI =
∫ θ¯
θ
HIdθ −R(θ¯)ν(θ¯) +R(θ)ν(θ)− γ(θ¯)q(θ¯) + γ(θ)q(θ) + ω(θ¯)Iˆ(θ¯)− ω(θ)I0
with
HI ≡ [(1 + λ)p˜i(q + a, a, I, θ)−D(q)]g +R[ν˙ − λg] + ν(−K/θ2 + a+ q)
+ γ˙q + γδ − ω˙(θ)I(θ) + η(θ − Aa) + τ(AI + 1)
and where η(·) and τ(·) are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to (22) and (21)
respectively, with τ = 0 whenever I = I0 and thus whenever ω(θ) = 0 (and ω˙(θ) = 0).
In addition to first-order conditions (28)-(30) which are unchanged, we also have
to account for
∂HI
∂aˆ
= ν − ηAaa + τAIa = 0 (31)
∂HI
∂Iˆ
= −(1 + λ)(AI + 1)g − ηAIa + τAII − ω˙(θ) = 0 (32)
and
∂L
∂I0
= −ω(θ) = 0 (33)
For θ > θs, as ω˙(θ) = 0, (31) and (32) allow us to deduce η(θ) and τ(θ), while
binding (21) and (22) give aˆ(θ) = a∗(θ) and Iˆ(θ) = I∗(θ). For θ < θs, we have
τ(θ) = 0, which gives η = ν/Aaa and thus
ω˙(θ) = −(1 + λ)[AI(aˆ(θ), I0) + 1]g(θ)− ν(θ)AIa(aˆ(θ), I0)
Aaa(aˆ(θ), I0)
Integrating over (θ, θs) and using ω(θs) = 0 (by continuity) yields∫ θs
θ
{
(1 + λ)[AI(aˆ(θ), I0) + 1] +
AIa(aˆ(θ), I0)
Aaa(aˆ(θ), I0)
ν(θ)
g(θ)
}
g(θ)dθ = 0 (34)
where ν(θ) = λG(θ) for θ < θ∗ and ν(θ) = −λ[1 − G(θ)] for θ > θ∗. Assume θs > θ∗.
We can rewrite (34) as ∫ θ∗
θ
f1(θ)g(θ)dθ +
∫ θs
θ∗
f2(θ)g(θ)dθ = 0
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where
f1(θ) ≡ (1 + λ)[AI(aˆ(θ), I0) + 1] + λAIa(aˆ(θ), I0)
Aaa(aˆ(θ), I0)
G(θ)
g(θ)
and
f2(θ) ≡ (1 + λ)[AI(aˆ(θ), I0) + 1]− λAIa(aˆ(θ), I0)
Aaa(aˆ(θ), I0)
1−G(θ)
g(θ)
As f2(θ) > 0 for all θ > θ
∗, we must have
∫ θ∗
θ
f1(θ)g(θ)dθ < 0. However, as f1(θ) > 0
and f1 and g are continuous, there exists θ2 < θ
∗ such that
∫ θ2
θ
f1(θ)g(θ)dθ = 0, i.e.
θ2 = θs, hence a contradiction. We thus have θs ≤ θ∗ , and (34) simplifies to (23).
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